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WILLIAM E. NELSON’S THE ROOTS OF AMERICAN BUREAUCRACY
AND THE RESUSCITATION OF THE EARLY AMERICAN STATE
GAUTHAM RAO*
It has become trite to observe that the state is “back in.” Since the
1980s, when political scientists led by Theda Skocpol enjoined scholars to
take seriously the concept and significance of the state in American history,
politics, and society, an enormous outpouring of work on the design and
meaning of the American state has colored the pages of law reviews and
scholarly journals.1 Legal historians have been important, and particularly
attuned, to this statist turn. Taking upon themselves the difficult task of
explaining the beginnings of contemporary expansions or contractions of
the American state’s capacity, legal historians have unearthed innumerable
contests over regulatory power, the location of public authority, and the
social foundations of the family—sex, marriage, and childhood.2 To some
extent, this turn is a result of the inherent importance of history in marking

* Assistant Professor of History, American University, Washington, D.C. I would like to thank William
E. Nelson, Felice Batlan, R.B. Bernstein, and Brad Snyder, for their comments and suggestions, as well
as the American University School of Arts and Sciences for providing research funding.
1. The central texts of the movement to reintroduce the state are, Theda Skocpol, Bringing the
State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research, in BRINGING THE STATE BACK IN 3 (Peter B.
Evans, et. al eds., 1985); STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE (1982). On the
fall and rise of the state as an object of scholarship, see Timothy Mitchell, Society, Economy, and the
State Effect, in STATE/CULTURE: THE STUDY OF STATE FORMATION AFTER THE CULTURAL TURN 76
(George Steinmetz ed., 1999); Brian Balogh, The State of the State Among Historians, 27 SOC. SCI.
HIST. 455 (2003).
2. For some fine examples of these works, see HOLLY BREWER, BY BIRTH OR CONSENT:
CHILDREN, LAW, AND THE ANGLO-AMERICAN REVOLUTION IN AUTHORITY (2005); MARGOT
CANADAY, THE STRAIGHT STATE: SEXUALITY AND CITIZENSHIP IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA
(William Chafe et al. eds., 2009); JOANNA L. GRISINGER, THE UNWIELDY AMERICAN STATE:
ADMINISTRATIVE POLITICS SINCE THE NEW DEAL (2012); DANIEL W. HAMILTON, THE LIMITS OF
SOVEREIGNTY: PROPERTY CONFISCATION IN THE UNION AND THE CONFEDERACY DURING THE CIVIL
WAR (2007); HENDRIK HARTOG, PUBLIC PROPERTY AND PRIVATE POWER: THE CORPORATION OF THE
CITY OF NEW YORK IN AMERICAN LAW, 1730—1870 (1983); SERENA MAYERI, REASONING FROM
RACE: FEMINISM, LAW, AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION (2011); MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE
SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF MODERN AMERICA (2004); WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE
PEOPLE’S WELFARE: LAW & REGULATION IN NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA (1996); BARBARA
YOUNG WELKE, LAW AND THE BORDERS OF BELONGING IN THE LONG NINETEENTH CENTURY UNITED
STATES (Michael Grossberg & Christopher L. Tomlins eds., 2010); MICHAEL WILLRICH, CITY OF
COURTS: SOCIALIZING JUSTICE IN PROGRESSIVE ERA CHICAGO (2003); Karen M. Tani, Welfare and
Rights Before the Movement: Rights as a Language of the State, 122 YALE L.J. 314 (2012); Anne
Woolhandler, Judicial Deference to Administrative Action—A Revisionist History, 43 ADMIN. L. REV.
197 (1991).
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the limits and possibilities of constitutional doctrine. 3 Also, generations of
scholars trained by history departments in the thralls of a broad embrace of
social and cultural history have located the functioning of legal doctrine
and mechanisms in areas once thought peripheral, if at all connected, to the
inner workings of high courts. 4
William E. Nelson’s Roots of American Bureaucracy, though, does
not quite fit in this historiographical trajectory. In this, his fourth book,
Nelson did not focus upon whether there existed a significant American
state. 5 Rather, Nelson assumed that there was, and to a great extent, that
there always had been. Nelson’s chief inquiry in Roots of American Bureaucracy was how and when a certain means of governance captured the
American state—”why the bureaucratic state was born in America when it
was—in the late nineteenth century.” 6 For Nelson, the “bureaucratic state”
meant a state in which “the power of government is generally brought to
bear upon individuals by bureaucrats whose edicts are backed by police and
ultimately military units capable of using physical force.” 7 The “bureaucrats” are expert, “salaried,” members of the civil service.8 In a society
ruled by the bureaucratic state, offices are distinct from the persons who
occupy them. “Professional groups” determine “normative standards” that
become the measures of enforcement. 9
A plausible case can be made that all of Nelson’s scholarship revolves
around war and governance. 10 For Nelson, wars radically restructure society and necessitate reformations or revolutions in public power. His studies
of how the common law worked, what it worked upon, and for whom it
worked, bring us to the point of conflict and other interactions between the
individual and the state in the aftermath of the American Revolution. 11 His

3. Paul L. Murphy, Time to Reclaim: The Current Challenge of American Constitutional History, 69 AM. HIST. REV. 64 (1963). For a recent explanation of how history came to bear such normative
significance, see KUNAL PARKER, COMMON LAW, HISTORY, AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, 1790–
1900 (2011).
4. J. Willard Hurst’s works have played a disproportionately influential role in this latter movement. See Harry N. Scheiber, At the Borderland of Law and Economic History: The Contributions of
Willard Hurst, 75 AM. HIST. REV. 744 (1970); Christopher Tomlins, Engaging Willard Hurst: A Symposium, 18 LAW & HIST. REV. vii (2000).
5. For a comprehensive bibliography of Nelson’s works, see MAKING LEGAL HISTORY: ESSAYS
IN HONOR OF WILLIAM E. NELSON 293-97 (Daniel J. Hulsebosch & R. B. Bernstein eds., 2013).
6. WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE ROOTS OF AMERICAN BUREAUCRACY, 1830–1900, at 4 (1983).
7. Id. at 2.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 2-4.
10. See MAKING LEGAL HISTORY, supra note 5, at 5-6.
11. See WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE COMMON LAW IN COLONIAL AMERICA (2008) [hereinafter
NELSON, COLONIAL]; WILLIAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF
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studies of New York present the “legalist reform” ideology and institutions
that, when taken together, momentously transformed municipal governance
in New York and, by implication, well beyond, in the epoch of World
War. 12 But even at this broad comparative level, The Roots of American
Bureaucracy functions on a different analytical register than Nelson’s other
works. Nelson’s scholarship on the common law teaches of transformations
over time. 13 The New York studies are more classically narrative histories
of shifting governmental power.14 The Roots of American Bureaucracy
traces the somewhat unlikely emergence and victory of the bureaucratic
model in American political and legal thought. 15
For anyone who has been lucky enough to have Nelson as a mentor,
the Roots of American Bureaucracy is undoubtedly a surprising book. For
one thing, Nelson, the consummate historian, is notoriously skeptical of the
unwanted intrusion of theory into good history. Many a young scholar—
and this one is no different—has doubtless received the same lecture from
Nelson about the dangers of dating one’s work by writing in reference to
theoretical debates and constructs. To a small degree, Nelson’s interest in
mapping out the rise of the bureaucratic state does associate his work with
the statist historiographical turn described at the outset of this paper. Written at the high tide of the Reagan Revolution, the Roots of American Bureaucracy offers an unqualified defense of the promise of a bureaucratic
state that was created chiefly to dismantle a dangerous tradition of American majoritarianism, as well as to functionally protect the minority in politics, economy, and society. 16
However, as I seek to argue in the first part of this article, excessive
scrutiny of the political stakes of The Roots of American Bureaucracy detracts from a substantive and important text. The book’s sweeping argument remains an important account of the bureaucratization of the
American state before the New Deal. Even more importantly, the book
drew compelling connections between the story of statecraft and main
themes in nineteenth-century American history long thought to have little,
LEGAL CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY, 1760–1830 (Stanley N. Katz ed., 1975) [hereinafter
NELSON, AMERICANIZATION].
12. See WILLIAM E. NELSON, FIGHTING FOR THE CITY: A HISTORY OF THE NEW YORK CITY
CORPORATION COUNSEL (2008) [hereinafter NELSON, FIGHTING]; WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE LEGALIST
REFORMATION: LAW, POLITICS, AND IDEOLOGY IN NEW YORK, 1920–1980 (2001) [hereinafter NELSON,
REFORMATION].
13. See NELSON, AMERICANIZATION, supra note 11; NELSON, COLONIAL, supra note 11.
14. See NELSON, REFORMATION, supra note 12; NELSON, FIGHTING, supra note 12.
15. NELSON, supra note 6, at vii-viii.
16. On the crisis of twentieth-century liberalism in the Reagan era, see SEAN WILENTZ, THE AGE
OF REAGAN: A HISTORY, 1974–2008 (2008).
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or nothing, to do with the development of state power, especially antislavery ideology and the market. 17 The rise of the bureaucratic state becomes a
nineteenth-century story that deserves extended discussion. In stark contrast to studies that emphasized the anti-statism of nineteenth-century law
and politics—for instance, Madisonian and Jacksonian political philosophy,
the laggardly arrested development of federal governance, and the synthesis of the so-called Lochner Era—Nelson confidently locates the crucible
of American bureaucracy in the nineteenth-century. 18 Finally, as a matter of
method, Nelson traffics in contingency and irony, which serve as an effective antidote to the monocausality that detracts from many histories of political institutions.
Most importantly, Nelson’s broad and ambitious argument provides a
skeletal structure for making sense of the state that subsequent historians
have filled in. Indeed, the book’s critical reception suggests that it came
before its time. 19 Several reviewers were befuddled at the very same aspects of the book’s argument that now appear as its main strengths. More
recently, though, several generations of scholars have picked up where The
Roots of American Bureaucracy left off. 20 As governance has become the
watchword of new legal and political histories, it is worthwhile to consider
the enduring legacy and contribution of Nelson’s book.
It would not be a proper comment on Nelson’s work, without the airing of an alternate thesis. In the final section, I offer a brief critique of the
Roots of American Bureaucracy – in a book interested in central, bureaucratic government, Nelson spends vast amounts of time discussing ideas
and meanings, but almost no time at all with the actual institutions and
governance that was unfolding in the United States. But at the level of everyday governance, a substantial shift occurred simultaneously as the emergence and victory of the idea of bureaucratic government. I argue that over
the course of the nineteenth-century, and particularly in the domain of the
federal government, bureaus struggled to rid themselves of the vestiges of
republican office-holding that had initially established the federal state
along the lines of its predecessor, the British Empire. By the late nineteenth-century, the reconstitution of the federal government would be complete. The bureaucratic state would thusly come into existence and, if we
are to take Nelson at his word, remain ever more. 21
17. NELSON, supra note 6.
18. For an excellent critical appraisal of this literature, see William J. Novak, The Myth of the
Weak American State, 113 AM. HIST. REV. 752 (2008).
19. See discussion infra pp. 1111-14.
20. See discussion infra pp. 1115-17.
21. NELSON, supra note 6, at 159-61.
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I. THE ROOTS OF AMERICAN BUREAUCRACY
In The Roots of American Bureaucracy, 1830—1900, Nelson argues
that American bureaucracy emerged out of a shift from majoritarian governance by political parties in the age of Jackson to governance by reformers and experts within governmental institutions at the turn of the twentieth
century. 22 The bureaucratic turn in American governance resulted primarily
from the actions of antislavery moralists during the era of the Civil War
who sought to protect minority rights that fell outside of the platforms of
the major political parties. 23 The failure of these antislavery reformers, as
seen most vividly in the collapse of reconstruction, propelled government
reformers to pursue a pluralistic state that was responsive to the rights of
individuals and minorities. 24 In identifying these scholars, Nelson attempted a historiographical resuscitation of the “mugwump.” 25 The mugwumps
were a middle-upper class faction of the Republican Party who had carried
the antislavery banner before the Civil War, now turned en masse to the
problem of the state at the end of the nineteenth-century. 26 For American
historians writing since the mid twentieth-century, mugwump lectures
about the moral crises corrupting American politics had come to appear as
nothing more than self-interested ideological rhetoric. 27 Nelson, however,
found no justification for this historiographical trope. 28 The administrative
state was a result of the profound economic, political, and moral changes
that dominated nineteenth-century America, and the mugwumps were
prime movers in creating those changes.
The early American state that became recognizable in the Jacksonian
era revolved around the problems of consent and majoritarianism. 29 The
elite rule of the colonial era had given way, after the American Revolution,
to the principle of a government built on popular consent. But the emergence of new institutions and individual free agency—at least for white,
propertied men—fractured and enervated the regulatory reach of municipal,
state, and federal governments. 30 Simultaneously, economic and cultural

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
(1998).
28.
29.
30.

NELSON, supra note 6.
Id. at 41-68.
Id. at 69-112.
Id. at 5, 160.
Id. at 82-112.
See DAVID M. TUCKER, MUGWUMPS: PUBLIC MORALISTS OF THE GILDED AGE, vii-x, 38-72
NELSON, supra note 6, at 5-7.
Id. at 9-40.
See id. at 22-30.
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changes wrought regional differences that obviated political unanimity. 31
Instead, “something less—the approval of a majority—would have to suffice.” 32 Majoritarianism thus rose to prominence in American governance
between 1820 and 1860. 33 In Congress, majority caucuses and majoritycontrolled committees slanted the lawmaking process to transparently favor
their majority. 34 From Jackson through Lincoln, Presidents used their authority to move the federal government away from elite control and, simultaneously, through the patronage, as a new institutional foundation to curry
allegiance among the new, broadened voter base.35 Political spoils and
favoritism were the modus operandi of federal governance. 36 Limited as
the post office, customs service, and land offices might be in comparison to
the organs of the modern administrative state then, they became enormously important for the continuity of majoritarian political rule and the political
economy that undergirded it. 37 Revenue, communication, and westward
expansion grew the state’s capacity while also cementing the people’s ties
to the nation. 38 Judicial instrumentalism, particularly in favor of economic
development, and judicial review, particularly targeted against popular
political movements, reflected the politicized nature of the judiciary. 39
It was the political problem posed by slavery, or rather the antislavery
critique of the slave power, that began chipping away at the Jacksonian,
majoritarian state. 40 Slavery thus set in motion “a circuitous process” that
resulted “in the emergence of bureaucratic institutions” in the early twentieth-century. 41 That process began in the ideological foundry of antislavery
discourse. Radical evangelicalism, transcendentalism, and eighteenthcentury “human rights” literature converged in northeastern antislavery
ideology during the 1850s to establish the principle that government must
act according to a “higher law.” 42 The unseemly excesses of proslavery
ideology, resulting as it did in the silencing of political speech, mobbing
against abolitionists, pushed antislavery partisans to refocus their “higher
law” on the basic principle of the necessity of protecting inalienable indi31. Id. at 15.
32. Id. at 16.
33. Id. at 40.
34. Id. at 16, 17.
35. Id. at 29.
36. Id.
37. See id.
38. Id. at 23-29.
39. Id. at 34, 35.
40. Id. at 41-46.
41. Id. at 42.
42. Id. at 42-45.
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vidual rights. 43 Only a short intellectual leap was necessary before this
philosophical dedication to individual rights became the foundational
framework of the Republican Party in the late 1850s. 44
In terms of governance, the era of the Civil War and Reconstruction
amounted to nothing less than the experimental application of “antislavery
moral precepts to political life.” 45 There was no better embodiment of this
experiment than the Reconstruction amendments: the abolition of slavery in
the Thirteenth Amendment, the promise of equality toward citizens inherent in the Fourteenth Amendment, and the protection of voting rights in the
Fifteenth Amendment. 46 Beyond the Amendments, however, a great deal of
governing would occur. Nelson makes sense of this great mass of lawmaking by developing a recurrent tension between Congress and the Supreme
Court.47 As Congress sought to expand the Federal Government’s authority
to enforce the principles of antislavery morality, the Supreme Court sought
to check it to preserve federalism and curb congressional overreaching. 48
Ultimately, the Supreme Court emerged victorious. For Nelson, the Court
of the Civil Rights Cases, long reviled as a conservative retreat from antislavery ideology and an embrace of institutionalized racism, was nothing
more than a realization that the principles of high liberalism, especially
limited central government, took priority over the already vanquished shibboleth of slavery. 49 In so doing, the Court aimed to illustrate that antislavery politics had become that which it once abhorred. The radical
Republicans and their allies had turned to the institutions of the federal
government to protect a minority—the freedmen—endangered by a dangerous majority of white supremacists. Yet, the Supreme Court established
that the Republicans’ activist governance endangered the architecture of
federalism. 50 In other words, in seeking to undo the corrosive power of
43. Id. at 42-43.
44. Id. at 51.
45. Id. at 64.
46. Nelson expands this thesis on the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment in a subsequent
work: “Those who adopted the Fourteenth Amendment did not design it to provide judges with a determinative text for resolving this conflict [between ‘individual rights and state legislative freedom’] in
a narrow doctrinal fashion. They wrote the amendment . . . to reaffirm the lay publics longstanding
rhetorical commitment to general principles of equality, individual rights, and local self-rule.” WILLIAM
E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 8
(1988).
47. NELSON, supra note 6, at 66-67.
48. Id. at 65-70.
49. Id. at 70-71. “It was equally possible, when the Civil Rights Cases demonstrated how intrusively governmental power would need to be used to legislate equality, for men like [Justices] Field and
Bradley to conclude that classical liberal values were at least as important as a specific antislavery
result.” Id. at 71.
50. Id. at 73.
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southern white racists, the Republican Party anointed itself an empowered
majority. 51 As the Court warned in the Civil Rights Cases, and in the Legal
Tender Cases and Hepburn v. Griswold before them, the tyranny of one
majority was poised to replace its predecessor. 52
By the late nineteenth-century, then, the problem of majoritarianism
remained. A new class of reformers now turned to the emerging discourse
of scientific rationality and social politics to reconstitute the institutional
foundation of American governance in such a way as to protect minorities
from the tyranny of majorities. 53 Their method was to resuscitate a moral
foundation for American politics on one hand, and to create institutions and
classificatory systems to translate that morality into policy to protect endangered minorities. 54 The former task was simple. In the Jacksonian political universe, conveniently shorn of any traces to slavery and cronyism,
reformers such as E.L. Godkin and Woodrow Wilson found their model for
the polity. Virtuous, democratic, and constitutional—these traditional values again became watchwords of the new science of American politics. 55
Science, or rather, the classificatory and institutional movements within the
broad intellectual embrace of scientific method that unfolded in these years,
offered the means by which to bring the nation’s traditional values to bear
on politics. 56 Each social problem had a social solution—for example, the
labor problem would dissipate under a managed redistribution of wealth,
the perfection of principles of contract, and scientifically justified protective legislation. 57 The reformers repeatedly sliced and diced American society into manageable cross-sections by classifying, managing, and
differentiating. The university, the corporation, and the regulatory agency
represented the culmination of this brand of thought. 58
51. Id.
52. Id. at 68-81. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. 457 (1871);
Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. 603 (1870).
53. NELSON, supra note 6, at 82-83.
54. Id. at 87.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 89.
57. Id. at 89-112.
58. See id. at 86-87, 90, 96-97. Nelson is perhaps purposefully vague about the specific nature of
these “reformers.” Nelson chiefly relies on quotations and concepts from E.L. Godkin, Richard T. Ely,
John W. Burgess, Lawrence Lowell, James M. Baldwin, Herbert L. Osgood, Herbert B. Adams, Albert
B. Hart, Henry Adams, G.S. Hall, Carl Shurz, Woodrow Wilson, Josiah Royce, Charles Sanders Pierce,
Thomas M. Cooley, Carroll D. Wright, George M. Pullman, Franklin Giddings, Charles W. Eliot,
William C. Russel, William Graham Sumner, and Herbert Spencer, to describe the reformist agenda.
Not coincidentally, Nelson’s difficulty in defining “reformer” is no different from the historiographic
problem of defining “progressive” with regard to many of the same figures that appear in Roots of
American Bureaucracy. See Daniel T. Rodgers, In Search of Progressivism, REVS. IN AM. HIST., Dec.
1982, at 113-32.
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Majoritarianism, antislavery moralism, nostalgic republicanism, and
scientific rationalism, converged at the turn of the twentieth-century to
produce the beginnings of American bureaucracy. 59 It was first necessary
to reform the problematic institutions that had constrained the possibilities
of American governance since the 1830s. While political parties continued
to dominate Congress, long-standing, all-powerful, omnibus Congressional
committees gave way to new internal organizational schemes, such as the
seniority system and the proliferation of specifically tasked committees. 60
In the executive branch, Congress “depoliticized” the civil service through
measures such as the Tenure of Office Act. These reforms had mixed results. 61 The Bureau of Indian Affairs was one of several executive agencies
that operated much as it had for most of the nineteenth-century, along the
axes of political spoils and favoritism. 62 Federal regulation and police authority, too, failed to overcome old ways, as seen most clearly in Congress’
lukewarm handling of railroad rates.63 Yet, through the pitched battle to
control the cost of rail travel, the “reformers” advocating scientifically
administered governmental institutions became a formidable and unmistakable force. 64
In the judiciary, this same turn-of-the-century reform movement “attained its fullest development” in legal formalism. 65 For the formalists, the
law was a science, not merely a language with which to make sense of
policy. 66 They influenced the curriculum of the nation’s leading law
schools to reflect this new scientific mentality, and reorganized communities of lawyers into professionalized bar associations. 67 Doctrinally, the
judiciary deployed substantive due process “to prevent conflict within the
political process between groups that were competing for wealth and power
in late nineteenth-century America.”68 In short, substantive due process
would protect minority populations—capitalists in Lochner v. New York,
peddlers and small merchants in People v. Gillson, and the poor in

59. NELSON, supra note 6, at 113.
60. Id. at 114-19.
61. Id. at 119-25.
62. Id. at 125-27.
63. Id. at 130-33.
64. Id. Notably, Nelson hesitates to name these “reformers,” in stark contrast to his more detailed
description of the scientific rationalist “reformers” enumerated in supra note 11.
65. NELSON, supra note 6, at 133.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 140-46.
68. Id. at 153.
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Allgeyer—from moralistic legislative majorities increasingly cognizant of
their institutional means of effecting change. 69
Bureaucracies would rule American governance thereafter—up to and
beyond the moment Nelson set out to write The Roots of American Bureaucracy. Twentieth-century social change, Nelson contends, has been constrained by a bureaucratic apparatus unwilling to allow a radical transfortransformation of political and, by implication, social and economic life. 70
At best, the American political system, working as it does through bureaucracy, can increase equality of access to resources and opportunities, explains Nelson, undoubtedly thinking about the multiple and overlapping
rights revolutions of the twentieth-century and beyond. 71 For Nelson, then,
bureaucracy is to modern politics what faction was to the Madisonian theory of republican politics in the founding era: a bulwark against the imposition of radical, or as Nelson calls them, “utopian,” solutions to social
problems. 72
Within the vast sweep of Nelson’s argument are several moving parts
that merit discussion. First, Nelson offers an essentially materialist argument in which the interwoven, almost unitary world of law and politics
reflect an economic world in constant crisis. The problem of majoritarianism in the Jacksonian era blossomed against the backdrop of profound economic change that unleashed the world of mechanization on the North and
accelerated the plantation kingdom in the South. 73 Central economic planning—the role of the state in the marketplace—was thus the great bogeyman of Jacksonian politics. 74 During and after the Civil War, antislavery
moralists’ successes and failures shaped, and were shaped, by a marketplace transformed by slave emancipation. The mugwumps’ scientific rationalism and the institutions they happened upon, such as the Pullmanstyle company town, occurred as interconnected discourses of scientific
management, such as Taylorism and actuarial logic, revolutionized the

69. Id. at 144-53. Nelson’s argument is expanded by Aviam Soifer. Aviam Soifer, The Paradox
of Paternalism and Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism: The United States Supreme Court, 1888–1921, 5
LAW & HIST. REV., 249, 258 (1987).
70. NELSON, supra note 6, at 160.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 161.
73. See generally DANIEL WALKER HOWE, WHAT HATH GOD WROUGHT: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICA, 1815–1848 (2007); CHARLES SELLERS, THE MARKET REVOLUTION:
JACKSONIAN AMERICA, 1815–1846 (1991).
74. See JOHN LAURITZ LARSON, INTERNAL IMPROVEMENT: NATIONAL PUBLIC WORKS AND THE
PROMISE OF POPULAR GOVERNMENT IN THE EARLY UNITED STATES (2001).
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corporate world. 75 Contemporary society’s ambivalence with bureaucracy,
which Nelson seems to hint at in the end of the Roots of American Bureaucracy, has to do with the great many “injustices” requiring action. 76
Second, Nelson privileges contingency and unintended consequences
as a matter of methodology. 77 No single group of historical actors, save for
perhaps the mugwumps Nelson rescues from historiographical ridicule,
pushes the narrative arc of the story of bureaucratic development. In many,
if not most cases, the historical actors’ consciousness and reform agenda
winds up producing a result altogether unforeseen and unintended. The
Jacksonian movement to empower majorities ends up problematizing majorities: antislavery moralists’ attempts at reconstituting the federal state to
protect endangered minorities further problematizes majority rule; the
mugwumps and scientific rationalists, seeking to produce institutions to
prevent utopian change, ensconce the only institutional mechanisms that
could possibly create massive social change.
Third, for Nelson, at least in this study, the law is inherently political,
and the political is inherently legal. The prominent space provided to judicial formalism and substantive due process as the “constitutional glue” in
the emerging logic of bureaucracy is a testament to this feature of Nelson’s
work. The formalist bench that promulgated substantive due process decisions saw itself as an obstacle, perhaps the only obstacle, to majority misrule. 78 Likewise, the great social problems of the so-called Gilded Age,
such as emancipation, protective legislation, and relations between capital
and labor, were sustained, technical inquiries into legal and constitutional
meaning. 79
However, the complexity of Nelson’s method and argument leads to
grounds for criticism. First, the connections between the Jacksonians, the
antislavery moralists, the mugwumps, the rationalists, and the formalists
are unclear. The “roots” of bureaucracy, as Nelson labels them, thus function like the sinews of republicanism in his advisor, Bernard Bailyn’s, Ideological Origins of the American Revolution—tidily progressing, easily
accessible, and ultimately perfectly interlocking. 80 Nelson also manages to
75. See JONATHAN LEVY, FREAKS OF FORTUNE: THE EMERGING WORLD OF CAPITALISM AND
RISK IN AMERICA (2012); JULIA C. OTT, WHEN WALL STREET MET MAIN STREET: THE QUEST FOR AN
INVESTORS’ DEMOCRACY (2011).
76. NELSON, supra note 6, at 161.
77. On the use of these tools in the historians’ craft, see WILLIAM H. SEWELL, JR., LOGICS OF
HISTORY: SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION 110-115 (2005).
78. NELSON, supra note 6, at 150.
79. See id.
80. BERNARD BAILYN, IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1967). Bailyn
would attempt to strengthen the ties between the intellectual conduits of republicanism. Richard D.
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flatten his cast of characters a bit. Other than the judicial formalists, who
reify the logic of bureaucracy at the end of the story, little is said about the
relative impact and importance of the main actors in the story, as if to suggest that they were all, somehow, equally important.
One might also wonder whether Nelson relies excessively on the elements of contingency that make the book so fascinating. After all, Nelson’s
protagonists are all unlikely, none more so than the judicial formalists.
Similar to more recent work about the interpretive possibilities of substantive due process doctrine, Nelson argues that the formalists’ use of doctrine
to strike down majoritarian legislation simultaneously protected minorities
and accelerated society’s embrace of bureaucracy. 81 Missing, though, is
discussion of how formalist doctrine, whether aimed at organized labor or
protective legislation, took aim at a regulatory regime that was trying to
protect minority groups from undue oppression. The historical fascination
with Lochner, Nelson is right to argue, does detract from a remarkably
dynamic moment in American legal history when it seemed as if nothing
less than the pillars of American life—the state and the marketplace—were
up for grabs. 82 Yet, the same problems that sparked protective legislation in
the first place would persist through the mid-twentieth century and directly
prod the rise of the bureaucratic institutions that serve as a capstone to Nelson’s story, such as the Department of Labor and National Labor Relations
Board. 83 One gets the sense that Nelson is determined to make heroes of
the formalists—in outlier decisions where they rule against monied interests or freedmen, for instance, they advanced an important rationale requiring institutionalization for the protection of American political life. When
the formalists rule for organized industry, though, they achieved the same
substantial result. This treatment unduly elevates statecraft from the morass
of politics and unnecessarily obscures the fact that the creation of bureaucratic institutions produced few winners, mostly among the propertied elite,
and many more who were less fortunate, mostly among freedmen and the
working class.
The final ground of criticism opened by Nelson’s themes and methods
is that a book about the beginnings of bureaucracy spends very little time
Brown, Book Review, 40 NEW ENG. Q. 577, 579 (1967) (reviewing BERNARD BAILYN, IDEOLOGICAL
ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1967)).
81. DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER: DEFENDING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AGAINST
PROGRESSIVE REFORM (2011); Victoria F. Nourse, A Tale of Two Lochners: The Untold History of
Substantive Due Process and the Idea of Fundamental Rights, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 751, 798-99 (2009).
82. NELSON, supra note 6, at 161.
83. On the importance of the labor problem in American law during the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century, see WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR
MOVEMENT (1991).
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on bureaucracy. Nelson’s exclusive focus on the federal government and
national politics ignores the remarkable transformation of bureaucratic
institutions subject to municipal and state control.84 Second, Nelson’s dogged pursuit of ideology, across this highest of intellectual and political
plains, and in the hands of an unlikely group of protagonists, leaves little
room for the actual goings on at early bureaucratic institutions. Nelson thus
forecloses the possibility that some element of the bureaucratic transformation of American politics emerged from governing problems experienced within early bureaucratic institutions. Congress’ almost unending
quest for reforming regulatory institutions in the late nineteenth century,
together with the legal community’s preoccupation with the limits and possibilities of federal power in these same years, suggests that drastic change
within administrative politics may well already have been afoot within the
government. 85
For such a slender, elegant volume to illuminate so many new themes
in the story of the American state, and to bring together so many seemingly
disparate strands of reform, however, attests to the incredible intellectual
importance of the Roots of American Bureaucracy. Until its publication,
the American state had no intellectual history. Why this was so is a matter
for a different discussion, but I suspect that the answer has to do with the
pesky persistence of several ideologies that, as Nelson makes clear, had a
great deal to do with the problem of majoritarianism in nineteenth-century
America—liberal individualism, American exceptionalism, and antistatism. 86 Indeed, the broad history of American government had, for too
long, epiphenomenally reflected any number of supposedly more foundational developments, such as social anxiety and market forces. 87 Meanwhile, other scholars had burrowed deep within specific administrations
and agencies, particularly under the influence of the bureaucratic change
that Nelson has uncovered. 88 With the Roots of American Bureaucracy,
84. See, e.g., ROBIN L. EINHORN, PROPERTY RULES: POLITICAL ECONOMY IN CHICAGO, 1833—
1872 (1991); JAMES LEIBY, CARROLL WRIGHT AND LABOR REFORM: THE ORIGIN OF LABOR
STATISTICS (1960); ALLEN STEINBERG, THE TRANSFORMATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PHILADELPHIA,
1800–1880 (Thomas A. Green ed., 1989); WILLRICH, supra note 2.
85. The internalist story of bureaucratic reform is the subject of DANIEL P. CARPENTER, THE
FORGING OF BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY: REPUTATIONS, NETWORKS, AND POLICY INNOVATION IN
EXECUTIVE AGENCIES, 1862–1928 (2001).
86. See Novak, supra note 18.
87. See, e.g., ROBERT H. WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER, 1877–1920 (1966), in which the
author pins the rise of the state on the crisis of a ‘distended’ society. For Richard Hofstadter, the emergence of industrial capitalism in the late nineteenth-century sparked anxiety about the nature and location of authority, necessitating a perpetual machine of reform. RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF
REFORM: FROM BRYAN TO F.D.R. (1955).
88. In the Progressive Era, the Institute for Government Research advocated for bureaucratic
reform by funding teleological histories of government that began in the purportedly stateless early
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however, Nelson took seriously the history of governance as its own field,
shorn of the ideological baggage of the Progressives. 89
Nelson’s broad, provocative argument was a remarkable achievement
in its own right. Yet, one can only truly appreciate the book’s value by
situating it within the scholarly waters in which the book first made a
splash and continues to roil.
II. RECEPTION AND SCHOLARLY LEGACY
Nelson’s creative and original argument cost him with reviewers, who
struggled to make sense of The Roots of American Bureaucracy. Though
political scientist, Thomas Vocino, and historians, Morton Keller and
Bruce Mann, lavished praise on the volume, the Wilson Quarterly published a short review that misstated the book’s main argument. 90 Historian
Ari Hoogenboom condemned the book as “flawed” because Nelson supposedly wrongly cast civil service reform as a means to the end of protecting minorities from majoritarian excesses instead of its more immediate
purpose of checking the spoils system—as if the two ends of majoritarian
excess and the spoils system were somehow impossibly unrelated. 91 One
breezy dismissal of the book hinged on the fact that Nelson did not share
the author’s ideas that the United States has always been dominated by
“individualism and economic liberalism” and that the Jacksonians effectively created bureaucracy. 92

republic and culminated in the rise of bureaucratic agencies in the early twentieth-century. On the
Institute’s agenda, see William F. Willoughby, The Institute for Government Research, 12 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 49 (1918). The incredible depth of the Institute’s research is suggested in the 1923 synthesis
of governmental history. LLOYD M. SHORT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE
ORGANIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES (1923).
89. See NELSON, supra note 6, at 7.
90. See Morton Keller, Book Review, 88 AM. HIST. REV. 1063 (1983) (reviewing WILLIAM E.
NELSON, THE ROOTS OF AMERICAN BUREAUCRACY 1830–1900 (1982)); Bruce H. Mann, Majoritarianism, Pluralism, and Bureaucracy in the Nineteenth Century, 11 REVS. IN AM. HIST. 490 (1983) (reviewing WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE ROOTS OF AMERICAN BUREAUCRACY 1830–1900 (1982)); Thomas
Vocino, Book Review, 77 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1048 (1983) (reviewing WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE
ROOTS OF AMERICAN BUREAUCRACY 1830–1900 (1982)).
91. Ari Hoogenboom, Book Review, 58 BUS. HIST. REV. 437 (1984) (reviewing WILLIAM E.
NELSON, THE ROOTS OF AMERICAN BUREAUCRACY 1830–1900 (1982)).
92. Joel D. Schwartz, Liberty, Democracy, and the Origins of American Bureaucracy, 97 HARV.
L. REV. 815, 824 (1984) (reviewing WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE ROOTS OF AMERICAN BUREAUCRACY,
1830—1900 (1982)). See also Book Review, 7 WILSON Q. 145 (1983) (reviewing WILLIAM E. NELSON,
THE ROOTS OF AMERICAN BUREAUCRACY, 1830–1900 (1982)); Kermit L. Hall, Book Review, 70 J. OF
AM. HIST. 429 (1983) (reviewing WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE ROOTS OF AMERICAN BUREAUCRACY,
1830—1900 (1982)); Arnold Milton Paul, Book Review, 3 LAW & HIST. REV. 440 (1985) (reviewing
WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE ROOTS OF AMERICAN BUREAUCRACY, 1830–1900 (1982)); Martin Reuss,
Book Review, PUBLIC HISTORIAN, Spring 1985, at 77-78 (reviewing WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE ROOTS
OF AMERICAN BUREAUCRACY, 1830–1900 (1982)).
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The reviewers’ difficulty with The Roots of American Bureaucracy also reflected Nelson’s dogged commitment to avoid popular historiographical consensus on any of his main themes and arguments. The mugwumps
were not self-interested reformers, or if they were, their true importance lay
in their unintended recasting of the potentialities of organized central government. 93 The federal judiciary was not merely a screen for elite capitalists
opposed to government and regulation, but rather was thinking its way
through a necessary reform of the organs of government. 94 Outside the
judiciary, government reformers were not acolytes of modernization, but
rather genuinely consumed with solving the problem of democracy. 95 Perhaps not coincidentally, a book that set out to illustrate the spectacular
transformation of governance to protect minority rights buffeted uncomfortably upon the main currents of contemporary historiography. 96
Above all, The Roots of American Bureaucracy was ahead of its time,
not simply in eschewing the historiographical trends of its own time, but in
anticipating the statist revival. In the thirty years since the book’s publication, scholars have followed Nelson’s lead in important areas: establishing
the nineteenth-century as the main topos for the development of the federal
state, identifying the problem of emancipation as a flashpoint of statecraft,
and rethinking the role of Progressives in the burgeoning of modern governance. 97 Below, I focus on one of these examples, the functions of the
early American state, in order to demonstrate just how significant Nelson’s
conclusions were in Roots of American Bureaucracy.
Nelson had brought our attention to the Jacksonian era to understand
how majoritarianism became the ruling principle of the American political
system. This was a significant rupture with the dominant view of the Jack93. HOFSTADTER, supra note 87.
94. Morton Horwitz would later echo Nelson’s position and, in so doing, describe the persistent
historiographical power of the idea that the Lochner Court was in the clutches of industrial capital:
The New Deal’s constitutional revolution of 1937 was justified not as a powerful break with
the old order but as a conservative restoration of neutral constitutional principles that had
supposedly been thrown overboard by the Lochner Court. The result has been to buttress historical interpretations that, for example, continue to treat the late-nineteenth-century judiciary
as having capitulated to big business. In fact . . . the Lochner Court was strongly representative of the old conservative view that big business was unnatural and illegitimate.
MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870–1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL
ORTHODOXY 7 (1992).
95. See, e.g., WIEBE, supra note 87.
96. Legal historian, Laura Kalman, historicizes Nelson’s work within an identity crisis that
plagued legal history in the 1970s and 1980s. Legal history had once been tethered to constitutional
history, argues Kalman, until a great fragmentation in the 1960s and 1970s. Nelson’s turn away from
constitutional history brought him to “the Americanization of the common law, dispute and conflict
resolution in Massachusetts, and the roots of American bureaucracy.” LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE
CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 75 (1996).
97. See discussion infra pp. 1113-17.
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sonians as either forward-looking creators of bureaucracy or entirely corrupt party hacks. 98 Nelson conceded both that the Jacksonians developed
“new structure[s]” of governmental authority and that political party ties
were their central means of power.99 Yet he also cleared a more nuanced
middle ground. The Jacksonians, he argued, used patronage to build allegiance within the electorate and they used that allegiance to govern. 100 Federal governance in the early republic was to be understood in the operations
of the federal agencies: the United States Postal Service, the United States
Customs Service, and the General Land Office. 101 This move was in itself
somewhat groundbreaking, for the early federal agencies had long since
been consigned to the scarcely travelled path of administrative history. It
was true that administrative historian, Leonard D. White, had published
important roadmaps of the early federal agencies in his early to midtwentieth century trilogy, The Federalists, The Jeffersonians, and The
Jacksonians. 102 One must also acknowledge the contributions of scores of
historians seeking to understand the political culture of Jacksonian America. 103 But Nelson suggests something altogether different: that the Jacksonians built a state that did important things. 104
The significance of Nelson’s claims regarding the early American
state are brought into relief when compared with those of political scientist,
Stephen Skowronek, in his locus classicus, Building a New American
State: The Expansion of National Administrative Capacities, 1877—1920,
which was published a year before Roots of American Bureaucracy. Skowronek argued that the federal state in the early republic was a state of
“courts and parties,” since courts and political parties did a great deal of
governing. 105 Nelson would agree on this basic story, but he would diverge
98. See MATTHEW A. CRENSON, THE FEDERAL MACHINE: BEGINNINGS OF BUREAUCRACY IN THE
AGE OF JACKSON 4 (1975); RICHARD P. MCCORMICK, THE SECOND AMERICAN PARTY SYSTEM: PARTY
FORMATION IN THE JACKSONIAN ERA (1966); Lynn L. Marshall, The Strange Stillbirth of the Whig
Party, 72 AM. HIST. REV. 445, 445-68 (1967).
99. NELSON, supra note 6, at 24.
100. See id. at 29.
101. Id. at 24-28.
102. LEONARD DUPEE WHITE, THE JACKSONIANS: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY, 1829–
1861 (MacMillan 1954); LEONARD D. WHITE, THE JEFFERSONIANS: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE
HISTORY (1951); LEONARD D. WHITE, THE FEDERALISTS: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY
(1948). A noteworthy exception is Harry Scheiber’s fine monograph, OHIO CANAL ERA: A CASE
STUDY OF GOVERNMENT AND THE ECONOMY, 1820–1861 (1969).
103. See, e.g., LEE BENSON, THE CONCEPT OF JACKSONIAN DEMOCRACY: NEW YORK AS A TEST
CASE (Princeton Univ. Press 1970) MARVIN MEYERS, THE JACKSONIAN PERSUASION: POLITICS AND
BELIEF (Stanford Univ. Press 1954); ARTHUR MEIER SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE OF JACKSON (Boston,
Little, Brown, and Company 1945).
104. See NELSON, supra note 6, at 29.
105. STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE 24 (1982).
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sharply from Skowronek in other foundational inquires. Most importantly,
Skowronek’s state of “courts and parties” did not take seriously the role of
the federal agencies until after the Civil War. Skowronek thus characterizes
the federal state of the early republic as “innocuous” and “evanescent.”106
Nelson, too, uses the word “weak” to describe the early federal government, but would likely reject the “distant” moniker. 107 After all, what made
political authority work for the Jacksonians was the circulation of contracts
and screeds through society. “In sum,” concluded Nelson, “the Jacksonians
commenced a reconstruction of the executive branch that was based on the
willingness of the people to enforce the will of a political majority in return
for access to wealth and power.” 108 This state functioned in significant
ways for many of the nation’s citizens. 109
While Skowronek’s text has enjoyed great popularity among political
scientists—and specifically, with the “American Political Development”
school of thought—it has come under fire by historians who, like Nelson in
1983, argue that, the early American state was an important actor in the life
of the early republic. To be sure, several historians have turned their attention to the institutions of state and local government to discover such a
powerful state at work. William Novak’s, People’s Welfare: Law and Regulation in Nineteenth-Century America, for instance, identifies state judiciaries and legislatures’ use of the police power as a driver of political and
economic change. 110 Robin Einhorn’s, Property Rules: Political Economy
in Chicago, 1833-1872, tells a similar story through the institutions of municipal government. 111 Jeffrey Pasley’s impressive, Tyranny of Printers,
studies the forging of political culture through the local press. 112
The organs of the federal government, that Nelson turned to in Roots
of American Bureaucracy, have become the foundation of a federal government that was not only active and energetic, but also “strong” in its own
right. Max M. Edling’s, Revolution in Favor of Government: Origins of the
U.S. Constitution and the Making of the American State, argues that the
106. Id. at 23, 29; see also Daniel P. Carpenter, The Multiple and Material Legacies of Stephen
Skowronek, 27 SOC. SCI. HIST. 465 (2003).
107. NELSON, supra note 6, at 24.
108. NELSON, supra note 6, at 24.
109. See id. Here is the context in which Nelson uses the “weak” label: “They may well have
sensed as they tried to discharge the duties of office that they could no longer take advantage of old
links with the old centers of social power to ensure uncoerced obedience, for those centers had become
as weak as they themselves were.” Id. For Nelson, “weak” is used in direct comparison to governance
in the colonial era, wherein, he claims, elite rule was a guarantee to mass compliance.
110. NOVAK, supra note 2.
111. EINHORN, supra note 84.
112. JEFFREY L. PASLEY, “THE TYRANNY OF PRINTERS”: NEWSPAPER POLITICS IN THE EARLY
AMERICAN REPUBLIC (2001).
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Constitutional settlement of 1787-1788 was, in fact, a victory for the Federalist vision of a strong central government. 113 Indeed, the state Edling
discovers is not so different from the impressive “tax” or “fiscal-military
state” that historians Patrick O’Brien and John Brewer have found in England around the time of the Glorious Revolution.114 Edling claims that the
strength of the American state resulted chiefly from the durability of its
taxing mechanisms. The steady flow of revenue guaranteed that the United
States would be able to establish its political legitimacy and defend itself in
warfare. 115 Edling’s position is likely too extreme for the Nelson of Roots
of American Bureaucracy. But Nelson and Edling agree that the early federal state was active and significant on one hand, and that it brought great
stability to domestic affairs on the other.
The interpretive distance between Nelson’s “weak” but significant
early American state, and Edling’s “strong” and significant early American
state, is bridged by historian Brian Balogh’s synthesis, A Government Out
of Sight: The Mystery of National Authority in Nineteenth-Century America. Balogh surveys the sum total of federal operations in the early republic
and concludes that historians debating the strength or weakness of the state
have been asking the wrong questions. For Balogh, the federal government
did indeed do a great many things, but it did so most effectively “when it
was hidden in plain sight.” 116 Through contracting, market-based activity,
and other tactics that ultimately obscured the governmental hand at work,
the federal government was incredibly powerful in “the day-to-day lives of
Americans,” but often times, was obscured behind self-cultivated myths of
rugged individualism. 117 Balogh’s subtle formulation is remarkably similar
to Nelson’s understanding of an active Jacksonian-era government that
remained nonetheless “weak.” What might have once appeared to be an
internal contradiction in Nelson’s argument now comes to appear, through
the prism of Balogh’s work, like a penetrating insight about the early
American state. 118

113. MAX M. EDLING, A REVOLUTION IN FAVOR OF GOVERNMENT: ORIGINS OF THE U.S.
CONSTITUTION AND THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN STATE (2003).
114. JOHN BREWER, THE SINEWS OF POWER: WAR, MONEY, AND THE ENGLISH STATE, 1688—
1783 (1988); Patrick K. O’Brien, The Political Economy of British Taxation, 1660–1815, 41 ECON.
HIST. REV 1 (1988). See also MICHAEL J. BRADDICK, THE NERVES OF STATE: TAXATION AND THE
FINANCING OF THE ENGLISH STATE, 1558–1714 (1996).
115. EDLING, supra note 113, at 40, 220.
116. BRIAN BALOGH, A GOVERNMENT OUT OF SIGHT: THE MYSTERY OF NATIONAL AUTHORITY
IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 4 (2009).
117. Id.
118. See Gautham Rao, Out of Sight, but on the Horizon: The Secret Life of the American NationState, COMMON-PLACE (Nov. 2009), http://www.common-place.org/interim/reviews/rao.shtml.
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Historians have also expanded on Nelson’s brief discussion of specific
federal agencies in Roots of American Bureaucracy to uncover a stunning
landscape of central governmentality in the early republic. Nelson’s hunch
that the United States Postal Service was a main driver of political order
has been borne out by historian Richard R. John in his splendid, Spreading
the News: The American Postal System from Franklin to Morse. For John,
the postal system “provided ordinary Americans with information about the
wider world,” especially commercial and political notices that would undergird Americans market and political activities.119 In so doing, the Postal
Service helped unite the nation itself. Through the activities of the federal
post offices, Americans came to appreciate “the boundaries of the community in which they lived” that “extended well beyond the confines of their
individual locality, state, or region,” as well as the fact that “the central
government might come to shape the pattern of everyday life.”120 Undoubtedly, John goes much further than Nelson in identifying the post office as
“a powerful agent of change” in the early republic. 121 Nelson, however,
was right to see the significance of the postal service as essentially circulatory by “manipulating news and opinion.” 122
Nelson also identified the General Land Office as “politically significant in the newly emerging states of the West” through its activities of
surveying and selling the public domain. 123 This was already clear through
the work of Malcolm Rohrbough’s, Land Office Business: The Settlement
and Administration of American Public Lands, 1789—1836. As Rohrbough
argued, the federal government managed a “flood” of settlement that
“brought new states into the Union, redrew the economic and political map
of the nation, and led to unparalleled sales of the public domain.” 124 Daniel
Feller’s fine study of the political contest over the General Land Office
between the Articles of Confederation and the late 1830s adds yet more
importance to this arena of federal activity. For Feller, as for Nelson in his
brief discussion, the significance of the land offices lies, not in the enormous federal revenues that resulted from land sales—as several historians

119. RICHARD R. JOHN, SPREADING THE NEWS: THE
TO MORSE 6 (1998).
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

AMERICAN POSTAL SYSTEM FROM FRANKLIN

Id. at 7.
Id.
NELSON, supra note 6, at 25.
Id. at 27.
MALCOLM ROHRBOUGH, THE LAND OFFICE BUSINESS: THE SETTLEMENT AND
ADMINISTRATION OF AMERICAN PUBLIC LANDS, 1789–1837, at 4 (1968).
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had assumed—but rather in the nationally directed project of western settlement. 125
Despite the significance Nelson accords to the General Land Office
and the national program of westward expansion, he has little to say about
the role of plantation slavery in the story of the early state. Here is one area
where Nelson was unable to anticipate a substantial historiographical turn.
For historians such as Walter Johnson, Brian Schoen, Adam Rothman,
Robin Einhorn, and Don E. Fehrenbacher, federal policy in the early republic was subject to, if not captured by, the slave power. 126 Perhaps no other
interest group exerted such power over the outcome and interpretation of
federal laws. Johnson’s, River of Dark Dreams, explains the indissolubility
of Andrew Jackson’s dual initiatives of westward expansion and a slaverybased political economy. “National security and white supremacy were
synthesized into state policy and military violence,” concludes Johnson. 127
The third area of activity of the early federal state Nelson identified is
the United States Customs Service, which Nelson sees as rife with political
intrigue and corruption by the era of the Civil War.128 “In the classification
and appraisal of goods,” writes Nelson, “customs agents had significant
discretion.” 129 In the use of their discretion, as well as in the “speed with
which” they entered and cleared vessels, customs officials had great power
in local politics and commerce. 130 This brief but suggestive discussion is
precisely correct, and it has been confirmed and elaborated by recent studies. 131 Two legal historians, Jerry Mashaw and Nicholas Parrillo, have illustrated how administration of the customhouses was pivotal to the forging of
federal administrative law in the nineteenth-century. 132 My own work on
federal customhouses in the early republic argues that officeholders’ discre125. DANIEL FELLER, THE PUBLIC LANDS IN JACKSONIAN POLITICS (1984). Most recently, William Bergmann argues that government managed western settlement signaled the existence of a strong
central state. WILLIAM BERGMANN, THE AMERICAN NATIONAL STATE AND THE EARLY WEST (2012).
126. See ROBIN L. EINHORN, AMERICAN TAXATION, AMERICAN SLAVERY (2008); DON E.
FEHRENBACHER, THE SLAVEHOLDING REPUBLIC: AN ACCOUNT OF THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT’S RELATIONS TO SLAVERY (Ward M. McAfee ed., 2001); WALTER JOHNSON, RIVER OF
DARK DREAMS: SLAVERY AND EMPIRE IN THE COTTON KINGDOM (2013); ADAM ROTHMAN, SLAVE
COUNTRY: AMERICAN EXPANSION AND THE ORIGINS OF THE DEEP SOUTH (2005); BRIAN SCHOEN, THE
FRAGILE FABRIC OF UNION: COTTON, FEDERAL POLITICS, AND THE GLOBAL ORIGINS OF THE CIVIL
WAR (Kathy Matson ed., 2009).
127. JOHNSON, supra note 126, at 26.
128. NELSON, supra note 6, at 25-27.
129. Id. at 26.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST ONE
HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (2012); NICHOLAS R. PARRILLO, AGAINST THE
PROFIT MOTIVE: THE SALARY REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 1780–1940 (2013).
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tion originally allowed customs agents the flexibility to enforce federal
regulations under adverse conditions. This same discretion, however, became problematic as the Americans sought to wall off their liberal state
from the seemingly corrosive forces of the capitalist marketplace. 133
Post offices, land offices, custom houses, tariffs, and slavery, then,
were the business of the early American state at the federal level. With the
exception of slavery, Nelson provocatively identified the significance of
these discrete elements of governance.134 However, it would take a conscious misreading of the Roots of American Bureaucracy to argue that Nelson predicted all of the historiographical twists and turns that have brought
historians and others scholars to the conclusion that the early American
state was agile, formidable, and potent. Indeed, Nelson insists on the
“fragmented” nature of government power in the era prior to the Civil
War. 135 Nonetheless, the historiographical shift that has occurred since the
publication of Roots of American Bureaucracy has borne out Nelson’s emphasis on the importance of the early federal government, while emphasizing its power and capability. 136
CONCLUSION
Some twenty years after its initial publication, the Roots of American
Bureaucracy remains an important study on the history of the American
state. It has rated mention in important historiographical assessments of
governance and politics in the early American republic.137 Scholars interested in the history of American politics continue to cite the book and contend with its main ideas. 138 A recent doctoral dissertation on executive
branch reform even placed itself in direct dialogue with Nelson’s thesis. 139

133. GAUTHAM RAO, AT THE WATER’S EDGE: CUSTOMHOUSES,
OF THE EARLY AMERICAN STATE (forthcoming 2016).

GOVERNANCE, AND THE ORIGINS

134. NELSON, supra note 6, at 22-30.
135. Id. at 15.
136. See BALOGH, supra note 116; William J. Novak, The Myth of the “Weak” American State,
113 AM. HIST. REV. 752 (2008); Mark R. Wilson, Law and the American State, From the Revolution to
the Civil War, in THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA (Christopher Tomlins & Michael
Grossberg eds., 2008).
137. See RICHARD R. JOHN, RULING PASSIONS: POLITICAL ECONOMY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY
AMERICA, (Richard R. John ed., Pa. State Univ. Press 2006); Ronald P. Formisano, The “Party Period”
Revisited, 86 J. AM. HIST. 93, 94 n.6 (1999).
138. For a good sample of these citations, see JOHAN N. NEEM, CREATING A NATION OF JOINERS:
DEMOCRACY AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN EARLY NATIONAL MASSACHUSETTS 230 n.65 (2008); JOSEPH C.N.
RAADSCHELDERS, HANDBOOK OF ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY 130 (2000); MARK R. WILSON, THE
BUSINESS OF CIVIL WAR: MILITARY MOBILIZATION AND THE STATE, 1861–1865, at 278 n.64 (2006);
Larry S. Luton, The Tale that Wagged the Dog: Is the Progressive Era the Foundation of American
Public Administration? 24 ADMIN. THEORY & PRAXIS 439, 455 (2002); Mary O. Furner & Barry Sup-
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However, as I have sought to make clear, a more important factor in
the book’s continued relevance is Nelson’s impressive, detailed breakdown
of the central components of federal governance over the course of the long
nineteenth-century. American historians, political scientists, and historical
sociologists have built upon Nelson’s brief, but prescient, sketch to offer an
increasingly complex understanding of the nature and role of the state in
the American past. As a new generation of scholars further investigates the
inner workings of governmental institutions in nineteenth-century America,
The Roots of American Bureaucracy will undoubtedly remain a pivotal
point of reference, both for the statist turn in American historiographyand
as a foundational substantive investigation of the early American state.
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